What Trump means for Asian investors?

US President-elect Donald Trump gestures a thumbs up at the clubhouse of Trump International Golf Club, in Bedminster Township, New Jersey, USA, 20 November 2016. EPA/

In the lead-up to January 20 when Donald Trump becomes US president, Asians are guessing about the outlook for their savings.

Trump is particularly difficult to read because he made so many wild statements on the campaign trail. Everyone accepts that campaigning politicians promise heaven and deliver mostly hell, but when they win elections, most become much more sober. So far, it looks like Trump’s policy will follow his campaign threats.

The Trump presidency will be bi-polar – either highly successful if he reboots American dynamism, or one that may bankrupt the country trying, including getting involved in another war.
His rise to power has been accompanied by wild swings in investor mood as markets yo-yo from hesitation to rally, with the Dow currently peaking.

So far, Trump family members appear to have more clout than was the case with any previous , with perhaps the exception of President Bill Clinton.

Disappointingly, the favourite to be Trump’s treasury secretary is ex-Goldman Sachs banker Steven Mnuchin, which means Wall Street would have another insider running the status quo. It remains to be seen whether he can simultaneously deliver the promised spending on infrastructure, tax cuts for the rich and containment of effects of a stronger dollar.

All signs are that the dollar will strengthen, bringing echoes of the famous phrase, “my dollar, your problem”. In its latest health check on the US economy, the International Monetary Fund reported in June that “the current level of the US dollar is assessed to be overvalued by 10-20 per cent and the current account deficit is around 1.5-2 per cent larger than the level implied by medium term fundamentals and desirable policies”. The IMF thinks that the risk of the dollar surging in value is high, and estimates a 10 per cent appreciation would reduce American GDP by 0.5 per cent in the first year and 0.5-0.8 per cent in the second year.

Trump is likely to be highly expansionary in his first year because the Republicans, having control of the Congress, Senate and the White House, must revive growth and jobs to ensure voters give them a second term. Note carefully that Trump’s election promises of stopping immigration, scrapping the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, imposing sanctions on China and cancelling the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are all inflationary in nature.

This is why if the Fed does not raise interest rates in December this year, it may be under pressure next year not to take any action to slow a Trump economic recovery. The Fed’s independence will be called into question, since Trump’s expansionary policy will put pressure on his budget deficit and national debt, already running at 3 per cent and 76 per cent of GDP respectively. A 1-per-cent increase in nominal interest rates would add roughly 0.7 per cent to the fiscal deficit, making it unsustainable in the long run.

Those who think that recovery in US growth would be good for trade are likely to be disappointed. So far, the recovery (which is stronger than in either Europe or Japan) has led to little increase in imports, due to three effects – lower oil prices, the increase in domestic shale oil production and more onshoring of manufacturing. The US current account deficit may worsen somewhat to around 4 per cent of GDP, but this will not improve unless sanctions are imposed on both China and Mexico, which would in turn hurt global trade.

Why is a strong dollar risky for the global economy?

The answer is that the global growth model would be too dependent on the US, while the other economies are still struggling. Europe used to be broadly balanced in terms of current account, but has moved to become a major surplus zone of around 3.4 per cent of GDP. Germany alone is running a current account surplus of 8.6 per cent of GDP in 2016, benefiting hugely from the weak euro.

Japan has moved back again to a current surplus of 3.7 per cent of GDP, but the yen remains weak at current levels of 107 to the dollar. I interpret the Bank of Japan’s QQE (qualitative and quantitative easing) as both a financial stability tool and also one aimed at ensuring that the capital outflows by Japanese funds would outweigh the inflows from foreigners punting on a yen appreciation.

The Bank of Japan’s unlimited buying of Japanese government bonds at fixed rates would put a cap on losses for pension and insurance funds holding long-term bonds if the yield curve were to steepen (bond prices fall when interest rates rise). Japanese pension and insurance funds have been large investors in US Treasuries and securities for the higher yield and possible currency appreciation.

In short, the capital outflow from Japan to the dollar is helpful to US-Japan relations. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the first foreign leader to call on Trump and likely dangled a carrot: Tokyo will fund Trump’s expansionary policies so long as Japan is allowed to re-arm.

From 2007 to 2015, US securities held by foreigners increased by $7.3 trillion to $17.1 trillion, bringing its gross amount to 94 per cent of GDP, official figures show. Japan already holds just under $2 trillion of US securities and, as a surplus saver, has lots of room to buy more.

The bottom line for Asia? Don’t expect great trade recovery from any US expansion. On the other hand, Asian investors will continue to buy US dollars on the prospects of higher interest rates and better recovery. This puts pressure on Asian exchange rates.

Of course, it’s possible that US fund managers will start investing back in Asia, but with trade sanctions and frosty relations between US-China in the short-term, US investors will stay home. If interest rates do go up in Asia in response to Fed rate increases, don’t expect the bond markets to improve. The equity outlook would depend on individual country responses to these global uncertainty threats.

In short, expect more Trump tantrums in financial markets.

 Think Asian By Andrew Sheng, a former central banker, writes on global issues from an Asian perspective.


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Ringgit Malaysia slides to lowest vs USD: fears of low oil prices, rate hike, rethink study options

PETALING JAYA: The ringgit has fallen to its lowest against the US dollar since August 2009 amid concerns over the impact of low oil prices on Malaysia’s economy and the timing of US interest rate hike.

At 5pm yesterday, the ringgit was quoted at 3.5425 against the US dollar, which has been gaining strength against all major currencies in the world. That represented a weakening of 10.81% for the ringgit against the US dollar in the last six months.

According to independent economist Lee Heng Guie, the ringgit would likely remain under downward pressure as investors were concerned about the impact of falling crude oil prices on Malaysia’s economy.

Malaysia, which is a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum, is seen as the biggest loser in Asean of lower oil prices.

“Being a net oil and gas exporter, it will cause a sharp slowdown in oil and gas investments and affect the Government’s ability to spend as it struggles to manage its fiscal deficit on account of falling oil revenue,” RHB Research Institute said in a recent report.

Low oil prices would result in some loss of income for Malaysia through lower dividends from state oil producer Petroliam Nasional Bhd and lower tax and excise duties. Petroleum-related revenues account for around 30%-40% of total government revenue each year.

Savings from recent subsidy reforms might not be sufficient to offset the loss in income for the Government that was looking to cut its fiscal deficit to 3% of gross domestic income (GDP) in 2015 from 3.5% of GDP this year, economists said.

There were divided views as to whether Malaysia would momentarily slip into twin deficits, a situation where an economy is running both fiscal and current deficits, in the coming months.

Brent crude oil, an international benchmark, fell to a fresh five-year low at 5pm yesterday when it was quoted at US$54.23 (RM192.11) per barrel. That represented a decline of more than half from the peak of around US$115 (RM406.80) per barrel in mid-June.

Investors are expecting the US Federal Reserve to raise interest rates in the coming months, following the end of its third round of quantitative easing (QE3) programme last October.

QE3, which was launched in September 2012, involved the buying of long-term US Treasury bonds to push long-term interest rates low to support the country’s economic recovery.

In the last six months, the ringgit had also weakened against other regional currencies, including the Singapore dollar, against which it fell 3.63% to 2.6493. The ringgit fell 0.91% against the South Korean won to 0.3184; and 2.9% against the Indonesian rupiah to 0.02801.

Nevertheless, the ringgit had appreciated against the British pound, euro, Australian dollar and Japanese yen over the last six months.

Yesterday, the ringgit was quoted at 5.4080 against the pound, 4.2249 against the euro, 2.8541 against the Australian dollar and 2.9397 against 100 yen.

By Celilia Kok The Star/Asia News Network

Weakening ringgit forces parents to rethink study options

PETALING JAYA: Parents planning to send their children to study overseas, particularly the United States, are beginning to feel the pinch with the ringgit continuing its slide against the greenback.

Many are reconsidering their options by looking at other destinations for their children’s higher studies.

Some are also planning to shorten the study period of their children to cope with the extra costs incurred, while there are those who are thinking of asking their children to take up part time jobs to help finance their education.

The ringgit has slipped to its lowest since August 2009 at 3.5280 to the US dollar.

A media practitioner said he enrolled his daughter for an American degree programme with a local college two years ago.

“She’s doing a twinning course with two of the four years to be spent in the US. At that time, the ringgit was holding up fairly well against the US dollar.

“With the ringgit’s slide now, I’ll have to cough up much more to finance my daughter’s studies in the US,” he said.

Retired pilot Wong Yoon Fatt, a father of two, said he planned to send his 18-year-old daughter overseas as he had saved up funds for his children’s education.

“However, if the ringgit continues to weaken, I may shorten the duration of their studies abroad. From three years, I may consider cutting it to just a year or two abroad,” he said, adding that he would encourage his children to take up part-time jobs during their vacation.

Housewife Noorhaidah Mohd Ibrahim, 61, said if the economic situation worsened, she was prepared to send her 21-year-old daughter Tasneem to study at a local university.

“If we can get the same quality of education here, then why not?” she said, adding that she was planning to send Tasneem to pursue higher education in Britain.

Mass communication student S. Samhitha, 21, said she had a choice of continuing her final-year overseas but opted to stay back because of increasing costs to study abroad. “I can still get the same degree here. However, the thing I will miss is the exposure of studying in a different country,” she said.

Law student Janani Silvanathan, who is in Britain, said she would feel the pinch of the weakening ringgit in her next term when she would have to travel back and forth from Bristol to London weekly.

“Transportation will be more expensive. A train ticket from Bristol to London costs RM180 each now,” the 24-year-old lamented. A 20-year-old film making student who identified herself as Stephanie said she was planning to study in Canada but would have take up a part-time job.

“The depreciating ringgit will not severely affect me but my parents will definitely incur higher costs,” she said.

Law student Lisa J. Ariffin, 25, who is studying in Cardiff, Wales, said she was more careful in spending money, even on food.

“I can’t eat out as often and will always look out for good bargains or offers,” she said.

By Yuen Meikeng The Star/Asia News Network

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Currency spikes in London provide rigging Clues!

An employee counts a stack of U.S. one hundred dollar bills inside a currency exchange center in Mexico City. Photographer: Susana Gonzalez/Bloomberg 

In the space of 20 minutes on the last Friday in June, the value of the U.S. dollar jumped 0.57 percent against its Canadian counterpart, the biggest move in a month. Within an hour, two-thirds of that gain had melted away.

The same pattern -- a sudden surge minutes before 4 p.m. in London on the last trading day of the month, followed by a quick reversal -- occurred 31 percent of the time across 14 currency pairs over two years, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. For the most frequently traded pairs, such as euro-dollar, it happened about half the time, the data show.

The recurring spikes take place at the same time financial benchmarks known as the WM/Reuters (TRI) rates are set based on those trades.


Fund managers and scholars say the volatile forex trading patterns look like an attempt by currency dealers to manipulate rates -AFP

Now fund managers and scholars say the patterns look like an attempt by currency dealers to manipulate the rates, distorting the value of trillions of dollars of investments in funds that track global indexes. Bloomberg News reported in June that dealers shared information and used client orders to move the rates to boost trading profit. The U.K. Financial Conduct Authority is reviewing the allegations, a spokesman said.

“We see enormous spikes,” said Michael DuCharme, head of foreign exchange at Seattle-based Russell Investments, which traded $420 billion of foreign currency last year for its own funds and institutional investors.

 “Then, shortly after 4 p.m., it just reverts back to what seems to have been the market rate. It adds to the suspicion that things aren’t right.”

Global Probes

Authorities around the world are investigating the abuse of financial benchmarks by large banks that play a central role in setting them.

Barclays Plc (BARC), Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc and UBS AG (UBSN) were fined a combined $2.5 billion for rigging the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, used to price $300 trillion of securities from student loans to mortgages.

More than a dozen banks have been subpoenaed by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission over allegations traders worked with brokers at ICAP Plc (IAP) to manipulate ISDAfix, a benchmark used in interest-rate derivatives. ICAP Chief Executive Officer Michael Spencer said in May that an internal probe found no evidence of wrongdoing.

Investors and consultants interviewed by Bloomberg News say dealers at banks, which dominate the $4.7 trillion-a-day currency market, may be executing a large number of trades over a short period to move the rate to their advantage, a practice known as banging the close.

Because the 4 p.m. benchmark determines how much profit dealers make on the positions they’ve taken in the preceding hour, there’s an incentive to influence the rate, DuCharme said. Dealers say they have to trade during the window to meet client demand and minimize their own risk.

Currency Patterns

“There are some patterns in currencies that are very similar to what I have seen in other markets, such as the way the price-fixings’ effects disappear so often by the following day,” said Rosa Abrantes-Metz, a professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business, whose August 2008 paper, “Libor Manipulation?,” helped trigger the probe into the rigging of benchmark interest rates. “You also see large price moves at a time of day when volume of trading is high and hence the market is very liquid. If I were a regulator, it’s certainly something I would consider taking a look at.”

WM/Reuters rates, which determine what many pension funds and money managers pay for their foreign exchange, are published hourly for 160 currencies and half-hourly for the 21 most-traded. The benchmarks are the median of all trades in a minute-long period starting 30 seconds before the beginning of each half-hour. Rates for less-widely traded currencies are based on quotes during a two-minute window.

London Close

Benchmark providers such as FTSE Group and MSCI Inc. base daily valuations of indexes spanning different currencies on the 4 p.m. WM/Reuters rates, known as the London close. Index funds, which track global indexes such as the MSCI World Index, also trade at the rates to reduce tracking error, or the drag on funds’ performance relative to the securities they follow caused by currency fluctuations.

The data are collected and distributed by World Markets Co., a unit of Boston-based State Street Corp. (STT), and Thomson Reuters Corp. Bloomberg LP, the parent company of Bloomberg News, competes with Thomson Reuters and ICAP in providing news and information as well as currency-trading systems.

Reuters and World Markets referred requests for comment to State Street. Noreen Shah, a spokeswoman for the custody bank in London, said in an e-mail that the rates are derived from actual trades and the benchmark is calculated anonymously, with multiple review processes to monitor the quality of the data.

“WM supports efforts by the industry to determine and address any alleged disruptive behavior by market participants and we welcome further discussions on these issues and what preventative measures can be adopted,” Shah said.

Opaque Market

The foreign-exchange market is one of the least regulated and most opaque in the financial system. It’s also concentrated, with four banks accounting for more than half of all trading, according to a May survey by Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc. Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) is No. 1 with a 15 percent share, followed by Citigroup Inc. (C) with almost 15 percent and London-based Barclays and Switzerland’s UBS, which both have 10 percent. All four banks declined to comment.

Because they receive clients’ orders in advance of the close, and some traders discuss orders with counterparts at other firms, banks have an insight into the future direction of rates, five dealers interviewed in June said. That allows them to maximize profits on their clients’ orders and sometimes make their own additional bets, according to the dealers, who asked not to be identified because the practice is controversial.

‘Incredibly Large’

Even small distortions in foreign-exchange rates can cost investors hundreds of millions of dollars a year, eating into returns for savers and retirees, said James Cochrane, director of analytics at New York-based Investment Technology Group Inc., which advises companies and investors on executing trades.

“What started out as a simple benchmarking tool has become something incredibly large, and there’s no regulatory body looking after it,” said Cochrane, a former foreign-exchange salesman at Deutsche Bank who has worked at Thomson Reuters. “Every basis point is worth a tremendous amount of money.”

An investor seeking to change 1 billion Canadian dollars ($950 million) into U.S. currency on June 28 would have received $5.4 million less had the trade been made at the WM/Reuters rate instead of the spot rate 20 minutes before the 4 p.m. window.

“Funds that consistently trade using the WM/Reuters fix are basically trading against themselves, and their portfolio is taking a hit,” Cochrane said.

FCA Complaint

One of Europe’s largest money managers, who invests on behalf of pension holders and savers, has complained to the FCA, alleging the rate is being manipulated, said a person with knowledge of the matter who asked that neither he nor the firm be identified because he wasn’t authorized to speak publicly.

The regulator sent requests for information to four banks, including Frankfurt-based Deutsche Bank and New York-based Citigroup, according to a person with knowledge of the matter. Chris Hamilton, a spokesman for the FCA, declined to comment, as did spokesmen for Deutsche Bank and Citigroup.

Bloomberg News counted how many times spikes of at least 0.2 percent occurred in the 30 minutes before 4 p.m. for 14 currency pairs on the last working day of each month from July 2011 through June 2013. To qualify, the move had to be one of the three biggest of the day and have reversed by at least half within four hours, to exclude any longer-lasting movements.

The sample was made up of currency pairs ranging from the most liquid, such as euro-dollar, to less-widely traded ones such as the euro to the Polish zloty.

Pounds, Kronor

End-of-month spikes of at least 0.2 percent were more prevalent for some pairs, the data show. They occurred about half the time in the exchange rates for U.S. dollars and British pounds and for euros and Swedish kronor. In other pairs, including dollar-Brazilian real and euro-Swiss franc, the moves occurred about twice a year on average.

Such spikes should be expected at the end of the month because of a correlation between equities and foreign exchange, said two foreign-exchange traders who asked not to be identified because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly on behalf of their firms. A large proportion of trading at that time is generated by index funds, which buy and sell stocks or bonds to match an underlying basket of securities, the traders said.

Banks that have agreed to make transactions for funds at the 4 p.m. WM/Reuters close need to push through the bulk of their trades during the window where possible to minimize losses from market movements, the traders said. That leads to a surge in trading volume, which can intensify any moves.

Index Funds

For 10 major currency pairs, the minutes surrounding the 4 p.m. London close are the busiest for trading at the end of the month, quarter and year, according to Michael Melvin and John Prins at BlackRock Inc. who examined trading data from the Reuters and Electronic Broking Services trading platforms from May 2, 2005, to March 12, 2010.

Reuters and ICAP, which owns EBS, declined to provide data on intraday trading volumes for this article.

Index funds, which manage $3.6 trillion according to Morningstar Inc., typically place the bulk of their orders with banks on the last day of the month as they adjust rolling currency hedges to reflect relative movements between equity indexes in different countries and invest inflows from customers over the previous 30 days. Most requests are placed in the hour preceding the 4 p.m. London window, and banks agree to trade at the benchmark rate, regardless of later price moves.

Opposite Effect

“Since the major fix-market-making banks know their fixing orders in advance of 4 p.m., they can ‘pre-position’ or take positions for themselves prior to the attempt to move prices in their favor,” Melvin and Prins wrote in “Equity Hedging and Exchange Rates at the London 4 P.M. Fix,” an update of a report for a 2011 Munich conference. “The large market-makers are adept at trading in advance of the fix to push prices in their favor so that the fixing trades are profitable on average.”

Recurring price spikes, particularly during busy times such as the end of the month, can indicate market manipulation and possibly collusion, according to Abrantes-Metz.

“If the volume of trading is high, each trade has less importance in the overall market and is less likely to impact the final price,” said Abrantes-Metz, who’s also a principal at Chicago-based Global Economics Group Inc. and a World Bank consultant. “That’s exactly the opposite of what we’re seeing here. That could be a signal of a problem in this market.”

‘Massive Trades’

U.S. regulators have sanctioned firms for banging the close in other markets. The CFTC fined hedge-fund firm Moore Capital Management LP $25 million in April 2010 for attempting to manipulate the settlement price of platinum and palladium futures. The regulator ordered Dutch trading firm Optiver BV to pay $14 million in April 2012 for trying to move oil prices by executing a large number of trades at the end of the day.

Melvin, head of currency and fixed-income research at BlackRock’s global markets strategies group in San Francisco, and Prins, a vice president in the group, said that because banks could lose money if the market moves against them, their profit may be viewed as compensation for the risk they assume. Both declined to comment beyond their report.

“Part of the problem is it’s all concentrated over a 60-second window, which gives such an opportunity to bang through massive trades,” said Mark Taylor, dean of the Warwick Business School in Coventry, England, and a former managing director at New York-based BlackRock.

World Markets, the administrator of the benchmark, could extend the periods during which the rates are set to 10 minutes or use randomly selected 60-second windows each day, said Taylor, who began his career as a currency trader in London.

‘Fiduciary Duty’

Trading at the highly volatile 4 p.m. close instead of at a daily weighted average could erase 5 percentage points of performance annually for a fund tracking the MSCI World Index, according to a May 2010 report by Paul Aston, then an analyst at Morgan Stanley. (MS) For an asset manager trading $10 billion of currencies, that equates to $500 million that would otherwise be in the hands of investors. Aston, now at TD Securities Inc. in New York, declined to comment.

Fund managers rarely complain about getting a bad deal because they’re assessed on their ability to track an index rather than minimize trading costs, according to consultants hired by companies and investors to help execute trades efficiently.

“Where possible, I would always advise clients not to trade at the fix -- but minimizing tracking error is so important to them,” said Russell’s DuCharme. “That doesn’t seem to be the right attitude to take when you have a fiduciary duty to seek the best execution for pension holders.”

- Contributed by Bloomberg, Liam Vaughan & Gavin Finch - Aug 28, 2013

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• Malaysian Ringgit drops to three-year low !
• Malaysian currency weaken as foreign capital outflow

Currency Wars: the Unloved Dollar Standard from Bretton Woods to the Rise of China

A yen for the unloved dollar standard

Tan Sri Andrew Sheng gives analyses the populist and expert views of how the yen measures against the “unloved US dollar standard”.

TRAVELLING around the South-East Asian region last week, the mood was all about currency fluctuation and impact on markets.

Things do look different when the Thai stock market daily turnover touches US$2bil and is higher than that of Singapore. But the headline that Thai growth slowed quarter-on-quarter but still grew 5.3% year-on-year gave rise to fears that export-driven economies in the region are beginning to slow.

The guru on the dollar relationship with the East Asian currencies has to be Stanford Professor Ronald I. McKinnon. McKinnon made his name with his first book, Money and Capital in Economic Development (1973), where he took forward the pioneering work of his Stanford colleague, Edward S. Shaw on the phenomenom of “financial repression” the use of negative real interest rates as a tax to finance development. His second book, The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a Market Economy (1993), was an influential textbook on how to get the sequencing of financial and trade reform right.

McKinnon's second area of expertise is the international currency order, explaining the macro-economics of the US dollar and its relationship with other currencies, particularly the yen and other East Asian currencies. The trouble was that his analysis did not “jive” with the populist policy view that “revaluing the other currency” would reduce the US trade deficit.

This began with the concern in the 1970s that the US-Japan trade imbalance was due to the cheap yen relative to the dollar. The Plaza Accord in 1985 was the political agreement to strengthen the yen and depreciate the dollar. From 1985 to 1990, the yen appreciated from 240 yen to 120 yen per dollar, followed by a huge bubble and two lost decades of growth.

In his important new book, McKinnon explains some uncomfortable truths with regard to what he called The Unloved Dollar Standard: From Bretton Woods to the Rise of China, Oxford University Press. The dollar standard is unloved because of what one US Treasury Secretary told his foreign critics of US exchange rate policy “our dollar, your problem”.

McKinnon argues that US monetary policy has been highly insular, despite globalisation making such insularity obsolete. He thinks that three macroeconomic fallacies were responsible the Phillips Curve Fallacy; the Efficient Market Fallacy and the Exchange Rate and Trade Balance Fallacy. In the 1960s, the US belief in the Phillips Curve that higher inflation generated lower unemployment resulted in the US pushing the Europeans and the Japanese to appreciate their currencies. When they refused, Nixon broke the link with gold in 1971.

In the Greenspan era (1987-2008), there was a strong belief in Efficient Markets, which encouraged global foreign exchange liberalisation, despite high volatility. But the most enduring fallacy is the belief that the exchange rate's role is to correct trade imbalance, hence the Japan bashing in the 1980s and the China bashing in the 21st century in order to push for their exchange rates to appreciate in order to reduce the US trade deficit.

McKinnon considers the third fallacy as the most pernicious conceptual barrier to a more internationalist and stable US monetary policy. Chapter 7, which is written by his student Helen Qiao, gives a robust argument why the third fallacy is wrong. She argues that while a depreciation of an insular economy with no net foreign liability may result in improved trade balance, it is not clear whether the depreciation of the dollar with a large net global liability is to the benefit of the United States.

In the case of Japan, a rising yen since the 1970s did not “cure” the Japanese trade surplus with the US. Between 2005 to 2007, when the yuan appreciated, the Sino-US trade surplus doubled. Qiao worries that China could follow Japan's steps into deflation and even a zero-interest rate liquidity trap if the yuan continues to appreciate.

The central thesis of this book is that the US should recognise that the dollar standard is actually a global standard, with many privileges and responsibilities. Depreciating the dollar is not to the US advantage, because it would only lead to future inflation. Instead, the US should concentrate on improving its competitiveness and manufacturing prowess. This requires having positive real interest rates.

The logic of the McKinnon thesis is irrefutable, although his American colleagues may find the conclusions somewhat unpalatable. The logic is that whoever maintains the dominant currency standard must maintain strong self-discipline, because the benchmark standard cannot be on shifting sands. If the dollar is weak because the US economy is weak, then all other currencies will be volatile, because they float around an unsteady standard.

For small open economies that maintain large trade with the US, having dollar pegs require them to keep their economies flexible and they must maintain fiscal and monetary discipline. This is the experience of the Hong Kong dollar peg.

Flexible exchange rates have not resulted in countries adjusting their overall competitiveness. What happened instead is that flexible exchange rates often allow governments to run “soft budget constraints” and try to depreciate their way out of the lack of competitiveness.

It is the refusal to make structural reforms that cause overall competitiveness to decline and these economies then go into a vicious circle of over-reliance on the exchange rate to keep the economy afloat. This is not sustainable, since if everyone tries to devalue their way out of trouble, rather than making structural adjustments, then the world will enter into a collective deflation.

The solution to this requires the US and China to work cooperatively at the monetary and exchange rate levels. This makes a lot of sense, which is why perhaps presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping are meeting soon to achieve rapport.

Anyone who wants to understand currency wars must read this book. It is an honest and frank appraisal of how we need common sense to get out of the current fragile state of global currency arrangements.

THINK ASIAN By TAN SRI ANDREW SHENG
■ Tan Sri Andrew Sheng is president of the Fung Global Institute.

Rising tides of currencies globally cause inflation, money worthless!

A PACKET of nasi lemak (rice cooked in coconut milk) with a fried egg costs around RM2 nowadays. I remember getting a similar packet (and in bigger portion) at RM1 ten years ago. It is a 100% price appreciation in ten years! My friends and I were jokingly saying that nasi lemak would be a good investment tool if it can be kept for ten years.

However, all of us know that nasi lemak is best served when it is fresh. It can never be kept for long despite its potential for value appreciation. In fact, its value will drop to zero as soon as it turns stale. And interestingly, the same situation applies to the money we hold today. Our currency can be as “perishable” as nasi lemak in this global money printing era if money is not produced for the right purpose and use in the right way and the right time.

The global economies have been embarking on expansionary monetary policies since the financial crisis broke out in 2008. Central banks around the world are printing money to support their economies and increase exports, with the United States as the primary instigator.

The Mighty Dollar

Since 2008, the Fed initiated several rounds of measure termed “Quantitative Easing”, which is literally known as an act of money printing. The Fed's balance sheet was about US$700bil (RM2.1 trillion) when the global financial crisis began; now it has more than tripled. With several countries' central banks including the European Central bank, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England taking similar expansionary measures and encouraging lending, more than US$10 trillion (RM30.3 trillion) has been poured into the global economy since the crisis began.

While the global central banks have become addicted to open-ended easing and competed to weaken their currencies to boost economies, the impact of these measures to the global economy is not quantifiable or realised yet. However, basic economic theory tells us that when there is too much money chasing limited goods in the market, it will eventually spark inflation.

When money is created out of thin air, there is no fundamental support to the new money pumped into the economies. More money supply would only be good if the productivity is going up or in the other sense, when more products and value-added services are created. In the absence of good productivity, more and more money would not make people richer. Instead, it would only decrease the purchasing value of the printed notes.

Let's imagine a more simplified situation. For example, we used to purchase an apple for RM1. If the money supply doubled but the amount of apples available in the market remains, one apple will now costs us RM2 instead of RM1. Now, our money has halved its original value. If the central banks of the key economies keep flooding the global markets by printing more money, the scenario can only lead to the worst, i.e. hyperinflation.

This occurred in Germany after the First World War. Hyperinflation happened as the Weimar government printed banknotes in great quantities to pay for its war reparation. The value of the German banknote then fell since it was not supported in equal or greater terms by the country's production.

Flood of money

The sudden flood of money followed by a massive workers' strike, drove prices out of control. A loaf of bread which cost 250 marks in January 1923 jumped to 200 billion marks in November 1923. People collected wages with suitcases. Thieves would rather steal the suitcase instead of the money, and it was cheaper to light fire with money than with newspaper. The German currency was practically worthless during the hyperinflation period.

That scenario may seem incredible in today's context. Nevertheless, we should not downplay the severity of a global inflation should the current synchronised money printing push the economies of major countries to burst like a balloon in sequence.

When this scenario happens, people with savings and fixed income will likely be the hardest hit. To withstand the tide of inflation, the best defence is to invest in assets such as publicly traded shares, metal commodities like gold and silver and properties that can hedge against inflation.

Investing in any assets require in-depth research before embarking on one. Commodities and stock markets are liquid assets that can be bought and sold with relative ease, while properties are favoured as long-term investment.

With Malaysia's current economic and population growth, added with its still comparatively low property prices in the region, our primary and secondary market properties are good investment assets for investors to gain from the continuous capital appreciation that this industry is enjoying.

With the above as a backdrop, are property prices really going up globally?

Using the nasi lemak analogy, if we were to buy a RM100,000 medium-cost apartment 10 years ago, it would be equivalent to 100,000 packets of nasi lemak. Assuming it has doubled in price today, it would still be the equivalent of 100,000 packets of nasi lemak at RM2 today. It would seem to me that the true value of properties hasn't gone up, but that global currencies have just gotten cheaper.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT
By DATUK ALAN TONG

FIABCI Asia Pacific chairman Datuk Alan Tong has over 50 years of experience in property development.

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Changing the international monetary system

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THINK ASIAN By ANDREW SHENG

ON Oct 5, 2011, the Triffin International Conference celebrated the 100th year of birth of Robert Triffin, a Belgian economist who was trained in Harvard, worked in the US Fed, taught in Yale and then returned to Europe to help work on European monetary integration.

He was of course famous for the Triffin Dilemma, defined as the inconsistency between the domestic needs of the reserve currency country and the external needs of the world that uses the reserve currency. Put in another way, Triffin identified that the reserve currency country would have to run a current account deficit in order to provide the world with greater liquidity.

Over the long term, running cumulative current account deficits becomes a large debt overhang that is called the Global Imbalance.

Triffin wrote about the Dilemma in the late 1960s, when the United States was struggling whether to maintain its peg to gold, which it abandoned in 1971. This removed the anchor of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which had been in existence since 1947.

The succeeding Bretton Woods II, or non-system as some critics call it, has become a system of flexible exchange rates, plagued by financial crises every decade in the 1980s (Latin America), 1990s (Mexico and East Asia), 2007-9 (US subprime) and today, the European debt crisis.

Today, there is sufficient awareness that the shift from a unipolar world to a multipolar global financial system carries with it great risks and unknowns. The unipolar world of dominance by the US dollar had a lot of advantages, as long as the US remained the unchallenged hegemonic power. The US dollar became not only the standard unit of account for global trade, but also the deepest and most liquid market and an important store of value.

The price of oil, gold and other important commodities are all measured in US dollars. The US Treasuries market is the most liquid and efficient clearing system, which is one fundamental reason why the dollar remains superior to the euro, which does not have a single eurobond market, being divided into different national (German, French, etc) bond markets.



According to the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) April 2010 survey data, the US dollar today still accounts for 85% of global foreign exchange trading, compared with 39% for the euro, 19% for yen and 13% for sterling (because FX transactions are paired, total turnover sums up to 200%). By contrast, the Hong Kong dollar accounts for only 2.4% and the yuan 0.9% of turnover.

Because of its dominance in international trade and payments, the US dollar still accounts for nearly two thirds of total foreign exchange reserves. China alone reputedly holds roughly US$2 trillion in US dollar assets in the foreign exchange reserves and holdings by Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises.

In 2009, People's Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan called for the use of the SDRs (International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights) as a possible global reserve currency. The logic for a globally issued reserve currency as opposed to a nationally issued reserve currency is impeccable. Nationally issued reserve currencies are subject to the Triffin Dilemma, because countries, however strong, will sooner or later go into deficit.

In other words, the whole global financial system is stable when the national reserve currency country is strong, but it will go into crisis, when the national reserve currency country goes into crisis. This is the current state of affairs.

The four reserve currency countries (US, euro area, Britain and Japan) accounting for just under 60% of world GDP are all in deep trouble. The US is running a current account deficit in excess of 3% of GDP and a fiscal deficit over 9% of GDP in 2011. At the end of 2010, the US had a gross foreign liability of US$22.8 trillion or 157% of GDP. Thank goodness that most of the debt is in US dollars, so that it can devalue its way out of debt.

The euro area as a whole has a smaller current account deficit of 0.5% of GDP, but if you look deeper, there are deep imbalances within the eurozone. Germany, the Netherlands and a few are in surplus, whereas the smaller countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain all have net foreign liabilities exceeding 50% of GDP, an indicator of crisis using the Asian crisis experience as rule of thumb.

Britain has a fiscal deficit of 8.8% of GDP and gross debt of 81% of GDP. Its one advantage relative to the Euro is that it can devalue its way out of debt.

Japan, on the other hand, has a net foreign surplus of 50% of GDP, being a major net lender to the rest of world, since it runs a current account surplus of 2.3% of GDP. Its vulnerability is, however, its large domestic gross debt of 220% of GDP, growing larger every year with fiscal current account deficit of 8.3% of GDP in 2011. This means that the domestic debt is vulnerable to bubble implosion, because if interest rate rises, the debt becomes unsustainable.

In sum, the reserve currency countries are in a double trap. They have to run loose monetary policy to keep interest rates low, so that their fiscal debt will not run out of control. But their central banks also know that exceptionally low interest rates are distorting not only global financial markets, they also have very distortive impact on their domestic resource allocation.

This is the liquidity debt trap that Japan got into in 1990 when its asset market bubble burst following the sharp rise in the yen exchange rate. Japanese GDP growth never fully recovered after that. Reserve country status has not been a privilege, but a curse.

The emerging markets are struggling because the present international monetary system has become unstable and unsustainable. How should this essentially unipolar system be reformed to a multi-polar system where yuan plays a role will be the subject of the next column.

l Tan Sri Andrew Sheng is president of the Fung Global Institute.

Currency War & Exchange Rates Tension!

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Tension over exchange rates

WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

Amid heightened fears over eurozone sovereign debt risks and increasing concerns about the health of the United States and eurozone economies, worried investors have flocked to the safety of haven currencies, especially the Swiss franc, and gold.

While investors and speculators have since moved aggressively to buy gold, the switch from being large sellers to buying by a number of emerging nation's central banks (Mexico, Russia, South Korea and Thailand) has helped propel the price of gold more than 25% higher this year, hitting a record US$1,920 a troy ounce earlier this month. At a time of high uncertainty in the face of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) latest gloomy forecast on global growth, few central banks relish the prospect of a flood of international cash pushing their currencies higher.

Massive over-valuation of their currencies poses an acute threat to their economic well-being, and carries the risk of deflation.

The Swiss franc

Switzerland's national currency, the CHF, should be used to speculative attacks by now. So much so in the 1970s, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) was forced to impose negative interest rates on foreign investors (who have to pay banks to accept their CHF deposits).

And, it has been true in recent years, with the CHF rising by 43% against the euro since the start of 2010 until mid-August this year. There does not seem to be an alternative to the CHF as a safe haven at the moment.

With what's going on in the United States, eurozone and Japan, investors have lost faith in the world's two other haven currencies: US dollar (USD) and the yen.

This reflects the Federal Reserves' ultra-loose policy stance and the political fiscal impasse in the United States which have scared away investments from the dollar. The prospect that Tokyo might once again intervene to limit the yen's strength has deterred speculators from betting on further gains from it. To be fair, the CHF has also benefitted from recent signs that the Swiss economy, thanks in large part to its close ties to a resurgent Germany, is thriving.

But enough is enough. SNB made a surprising announcement on Sept 6 that it would buy foreign currencies in “unlimited quantities” to combat a huge over-valuation of the CHF, and keep the franc-euro exchange rate above 1.20 with the “utmost determination.”

On Aug 9, the CHF reached a new record, touching near parity against the euro from 1.25 at the start of the year, while the USD sank to almost CHF 0.70 (from 0.93). The impact so far has been positive: the euro rose 8% on that day and the 1.20 franc level had since stabilised. It was a gamble.

Of course, SNB had intervened before in 2009 and 2010, but in a limited way at a time when the euro was far stronger. But this time, with the nation's economy buckling under the currency's massive over-valuation, the risks of doing nothing were far greater. In July last year, following a chequered history of frustrated attempts, SNB vowed it would not intervene again. By then, the central bank was already awash with foreign currency reserves. Worse, the CHF value of these reserves plunged as the currency strengthened. In 2010, SNB recorded a loss of CHF20 billion, and a further CHF10 billion in 1H'11. As a result, SNB came under severe political pressure for not paying the expected dividend. But exporters also demanded further intervention to stop the continuing appreciation.

This time, SNB is up against a stubborn euro-debt crisis which just won't go away. True, recent efforts have been credible. Indeed, the 1.20 francs looks defensible, even though the CHF remains over-valued. Fair value appears to be closer to 1.30-1.40. But inflation is low; still, the risk of asset-price bubbles remains. What's worrisome is SNB acted alone. For the European Central Bank (ECB), the danger lies in SNB's eventual purchases of higher quality German and French eurozone government bonds with the intervention receipts, countering the ECB's own intervention in the bond market to help weaker members of Europe's monetary union, including Italy and Spain.



This causes the spread between the yields of these bonds to widen, and pile on further pressure on peripheral economies. Furthermore, unlimited Swiss buying of euro would push up its value, adding to deflationary pressures in the region.

The devil's trade-off

As I see it, the Swiss really has no other options. SNB has been attempting to drive down the CHF by intervening in the money markets but with little lasting effect. “The current massive over-valuation of the CHF poses an acute threat to the Swiss economy,” where exports accounted for 35% of its gross domestic product. The new policy would help exports and help job security. As of now, there is no support from Europe to drive the euro higher.

SNB is caught in the “devil's trade-off,” having to choose risking its balance sheet rather than risk “mounting unemployment, deflation and economic damage.” The move is bound to cause distortions and tension over exchange rates globally.

New haven: the Nokkie'

SNB's new policy stance has sent ripples through currency markets. In Europe, it drove the Norwegian krone (Nokkie) to an eight-year high against the euro as investors sought out alternative safe havens. Since money funds must have a minimum exposure in Europe and, with most European currencies discredited and quality bonds yielding next to nothing, the Nokkie became a principal beneficiary. It offers 3% return for three-month money-market holdings.

Elsewhere, the Swedish krona also gained ground, rising to its strongest level against the euro since June after its central bank left its key interest rates unchanged, while signalling that the rate will only creep up. What's worrisome is that if there is continuing upward pressure on the Nokkie or the krona, their central banks would act, if needed with taxes and exchange controls. With interest rates at or near zero and fiscal policy exhausted or ruled out politically in the most advanced nations, currencies remain one of the only policy tools left.

At a time of high uncertainty, investors are looking for havens. Apart from gold and some real assets, few countries would welcome fresh inflows which can stir to over-value currencies. Like it or not, speculative capital will still find China and Indonesia particularly attractive.

Yen resists the pressure 

SNB's placement of a “cap” to weaken the CHF has encouraged risk-adverse investors who sought comfort in the franc to turn to the yen instead. So far, the yen has stayed below its record high reached in mid-August. But it remains well above the exporters' comfort level.

Indeed, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has signalled its readiness to ease policy to help as global growth falters. But so far, the authorities are happy just monitoring and indications are they will resist pressure to be as bold as the Swiss, for three main reasons: (i) unlike to CHF, the yen is not deemed to be particularly strong at this time it's roughly in line with its 30-year average; (ii) unlike SNB, Japan is expected to respect the G-7's commitment to market determined exchange rates; and (iii) Japan's economy is five times the size of Switzerland and the yen trading volume makes defending a pre-set rate in the global markets well-nigh impractical.

Still, they have done so on three occasions over the past 12 months: a record 4.51 trillion yen sell-off on Aug 9 (surpassing the previous daily record of 2.13 trillion yen from Sept 2010).

The operation briefly pushed the USD to 80.25 yen (from 77.1 yen) but the effects quickly waned and the dollar fell back to a record low of 75.9 yen on Aug 19. But, I gather the Finance Ministry needs to meet three conditions for intervention: (a) the yen/USD rate has to be volatile; (b) a simultaneous easing by BoJ; and (c) intervention restricted to one day only.

Given these constraints, it is no wonder MOF has failed to arrest the yen's underlying trend. In the end, I think the Japanese has learnt to live with it unlike the Swiss who has the motivation and means to resist a strong currency.

Reprieve for the yuan 

I sense one of the first casualties of the failing global economic expansion is renewed pressure to further appreciate the yuan. For China, August was a good month to adjust strong exports, high inflation and intense international pressure. As a result, the yuan appreciated against the USD by more than 11%, up from an average of about 5% in the first seven months of the year. However, the surge had begun to fade in the first half of September.

But with the United States and eurozone economic outlook teetering in gloom, China's latest manufacturing performance had also weakened, reflecting falling overseas demand.

This makes imposing additional currency pressure on exporters a no-go. Meanwhile, inflation has stabilised. Crude oil and imported food prices have declined, reducing inflationary pressure and the incentive to further appreciate the yuan. Looks like September provided a period of some relief. But, make no mistake, the pressure is still there. The fading global recovery may have papered over the cracks. Pressure won't grind to a halt.

Central banks instinctively try to ward-off massive capital flows appreciating their currencies. There are similarities between what's happening today, highlighted by the recent defensive move by SNB, and the tension over exchange rates at last year-end. It's an exercise in pushing the problem next door.

This can be viewed as a consequence of recent Japanese action (Tokyo's repeated intervention to sell yen). It threatens to start a chain of responses where every central bank tries to weaken its currency in the face of poor global economic prospects and growing uncertainty. So far, the tension has not risen to anything like last year's level. But with rising political pressure provoking resistance to currency appreciation, the potential for a fresh outbreak remains real. The Brazilian Finance Minister just repeated his warning last year that continuing loose US monetary policies could stoke a currency war.

Growing stress

With the euro under growing stress from sovereign debt problems, the market's focus is turning back to Japan (prompting a new plan to deal with a strong yen), to non-eurozone nations (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and possibly the United Kingdom) and on to Asia (already the ringgit, rupiah, baht and won are coming under pressure on concerns over uncertainty and capital flight). Similarly, Brazil's recent actions to limit currency appreciation highlights the dilemma faced by fast growing economies (Turkey, Chile and Russia) since allowing currency appreciation limits domestic overheating but also undermines competitiveness.

This low level currency war between emerging and advanced economies had further unsettled financial markets.

Given the weak economic outlook, most governments would prefer to see their currencies weaken to help exports. The risk, as in the 1930s, is not just “beggar-thy-neighbour” devaluations but resort to a wide range of trade barriers as well. Globally co-ordinated policies under G-20 are preferred. But that's easier said than done.

So, it is timely for the IMF's September “World Economic Outlook” to warn of “severe repercussions” to the global economy as the United States and eurozone could face recession and a “lost decade” of growth (a replay of Japan in the 90s) unless nations revamped economic policies. For the United States, this means less reliance on debt and putting its fiscal house in order.

For the eurozone, firm resolution of the debt crisis, including strengthening its banking system. For China, increased reliance on domestic demand. And, for Brazil, cooling an over-heating economy. This weekend, the G-20 is expected to take-up global efforts to rebalance the world overwhelmed by heightened risks to growth and the deepening debt crisis. Focus is expected on the role of exchange rates in rebalancing growth, piling more pressure on China's yuan.

Frankly, IMF meetings and G-20 gatherings don't have a track record of getting things done. I don't expect anything different this time. The outlook just doesn't look good.

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.