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Saturday, February 20, 2010

Waltzing around exchange rates

 Ultimately, they reflect the underlying strength or weakness of the real economy

AS the textbook says, money is a means of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. When we discuss foreign exchange rates, we mean the value of the domestic currency against a foreign benchmark.

Since there are many such benchmarks or standards, we use the most common one, which is the US dollar. This is because the US dollar is the most widely used reserve currency, as it accounts for roughly two-thirds of global foreign exchange trading and official foreign exchange reserves.

Most people use the US dollar standard because not only is it the most convenient, it also by and large has been a good store of value, at least relative to other currencies.

If you travel as a tourist in most parts of the world, you will find that you cannot change your own currency easily, but you can easily change against the US dollar. The US dollar is the reserve currency standard because it meets all the conditions of international unit of account, means of payment and store of value.

But with the US running unsustainable current account deficits and a growing net foreign debt position, the US dollar faces structural depreciation, which creates growing uncertainty on a global scale.

The real problem stems from the fact that all foreign exchange rates are relative and not absolute values. Value is relative not only against real goods, but against other paper currencies.

If we use a metal as standard, such as gold, and the quantum of gold remains static as the global demand for liquidity increases, then prices will be deflationary. The gold standard was found to be too strict a disciplinarian, because if all currencies are linked to gold, you cannot run a fiscal or trade deficit without huge outflows of gold.

The advantage of using a paper currency is that the supply can be adjusted to the national or global needs. As monetarists claim, inflation is basically a monetary problem of printing too much money. Money can be printed through growing fiscal debt, growing bank credit or inflow of foreign funds.

You can print domestic money, but you can’t print foreign money. In other words, you can ask domestic people to bear the inflation tax by printing money, but the foreigner (and today locals) can run through capital outflow. They stop investing and lending money and you end up with a fiscal or currency crisis.

The bottom line is that in the long run, you cannot spend more than what you earn. Thus, when conventional economists say that flexible exchange rates help with monetary policy, they think that there is an easy way out of this problem.

Flexible exchange rates may help a little in day-to-day adjustment in prices, but ultimately, there is always the temptation to use the exchange rate to devalue your way out of the fundamental problem of spending more than you earn.

This is exactly the Greek tragedy. Greece is part of the eurozone, which uses the Maastricht Treaty rules to stop member countries from printing too much money to ensure that the euro will have stable value. The Maastricht rules draw the line of the annual fiscal deficit at not more than 3% of GDP (or gross domestic product) and total fiscal debt at 60% of GDP.

The Greeks ran a fiscal deficit of more than 12.7% deficit in 2009 and total fiscal debt is now at 120% of GDP. They hid the deficits for more than 10 years by various tricks, including using investment bankers to do swaps to hide the deficits.

In the 1990s, leading investment banks were fined in Japan for helping Japanese companies and banks hide their losses. Now they are bold enough to help governments hide their deficits.

To put it bluntly, neither fixed nor flexible exchange rates can hide the fact that if a borrower spends more than it earns, be it a company or a government, the day of reckoning will come soon.

Fixed exchange rates are a discipline – the profligacy will show up very fast. Flexible exchange rates use a weaker currency to try and earn more exports. But if the source of overspending is the government aided by loose monetary policy, then sooner or later the foreigner will stop lending or investing. You cannot jazz your way out of over-spending. Sooner or later the music must stop.

The Greeks thought that being part of the eurozone, the other Europeans would bail out Greece, so non-Greeks will help pay for their over-spending. Since Greece cannot devalue the euro by itself, then the pain of adjustment must be done on the fiscal or employment side. In other words, a fixed exchange rate ultimately forces the structural adjustment. The Europeans are asking Greece to make that adjustment as a condition for help.

We cannot think about exchange rates as only bilateral, that is, between currency A and currency B. We saw that before the Asian crisis, when East Asian currencies were mostly benchmarked against the US dollar, with some fixed and others floating. Nevertheless, each currency had some kind of parity against each other.

For example, before the crisis in 1997, the ringgit was roughly 2.5 to one US dollar, the Thai baht 25, the Filipino peso 25 and the Taiwan dollar also 25. In other words, they adjusted at roughly one or 10 to each other. This made it very convenient to do business across East Asian borders, mainly because of trade competitiveness.

Each central bank knew that if the rates moved out of line, not only against the US dollar but against the neighbours, there would be trade competitive issues.

This regional pattern of currencies “waltzing against each other” in a stable pattern unless disrupted by crisis was formed by the underlying Asian Global Supply Chain. After the Asian crisis, when most currencies floated, the same pattern emerged, because the underlying needs of the Asian Global Supply Chain forced some competitive stability between the linked exchange rates.

In sum, exchange rates ultimately reflect the underlying strength or weakness of the real economy. You can jazz up all you want through flexible rates, but ultimately if you overspend, you pay.

Andrew Sheng is author of the book, From Asian to Global Financial Crisis.

1 comment:

  1. Get the right messages: "if you overspend, you pay" for it.

    "Neither fixed nor flexible exchange rates can hide the fact that if a borrower spends more than it earns, be it a company or a government, or even an individual, the day of reckoning will come soon".

    The Greeks ran a fiscal deficit of more than 12.7% deficit in 2009 and total fiscal debt is now at 120% of GDP. They hid the deficits for more than 10 years by various tricks, including using investment bankers to do swaps to hide the deficits.

    If anybody overspend, hide the loses and deficits, they must pay for them, be it governments, companies or individuals!

    ReplyDelete