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Tuesday, May 11, 2010

How did bad tax policy contribute to the financial meltdown?

Tax policy and the global financial crisis

 

IT has been widely held that one of the immediate causes of the 2008/2009 US financial crisis is the subprime housing loans there, which via various ingenious financial instruments had at some point in time seriously put at risk the whole global financial system.

Policymakers, meanwhile, are engaged in a debate as to how new regulations could be introduced into financial systems to curb the assumption of excessive risk-taking and, at the same time, look into how banks and financial institutions be subjected to new capitalisation rules going forward.

One area that has not been widely looked at is the role of tax policy in the crisis.

The immediate response by many countries was to cut corporate tax rates as a short term measure to cope with the sharp economic contraction.

But how did bad tax policy contribute to the crisis?

It was only recently that the Internatianal Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produced two reports in response to the questions: “What aspects of the tax system has helped cause or exacerbate the crisis, and whether tax policy needs to be reevaluated” in light of what has happened.

The reports looked at the US income tax system and lessons can be learnt from them since our own system can adopt some of these policy initiatives.

Preference for debt vs equity financing 

This is seen as an obvious link to the crisis.
When a company wishes to finance its business, should it look to borrowings (debt) or should it finance through capital (equity)?

Most tax systems, including Malaysia’s system, favours debt financing over equity financing because of the deductibility of interest payments and the non-deductibility of the cost of equity capital.

Thus, this obvious bias for debt financing is recognised particularly at the corporate level.
With the surge in corporate borrowings in the last decade or so, including leveraged buyouts and the intense activities of private equity funds, the possibility that this bias may have contributed to the risks in the system is a serious consideration.

There is little doubt that under such a bias system, corporate finance will always respond positively to tax considerations.

This tax preference for debt has been long-standing and widely recognised by tax practitioners, something which could make an otherwise non-profitable investment profitable.

The position in Malaysia so far seems to reflect the common bias towards debt financing although the introduction of thin capitalisation rules, which are being awaited, could change that scenario.

The US housing bubble

The bubble is generally understood to have been the effect of increased household borrowings and high house prices.

The tax rule in the United States allows mortgage interest taken out on a home to be fully deductible against income from employment earnings.

Thus with the expectation of increases in home prices, this has raised the expected returns on borrowings to purchase houses.

Analysts believe that this could be a contributing factor but are unable to point to empirical evidence, given the range and complexity of the various instruments that were in place when the bubble burst.

Tax planning and lack of transparency

The need to give further study to this possible link is recognised - that the development of complex financial instruments could in part be spurred by the tax avoidance opportunity that could arise.

Thus, swaps have been used to avoid withholding tax.

The use of offshore low tax jurisdictions to hold funds has helped create an opaque environment.
The G20 initiatives last year in curbing such practice have seen countries with low tax jurisdictions responding to a global initiative to conclude agreements for the exchange of information.

Malaysia is a signatory to such agreements.

Restriction in the transfer of tax losses 

This refers to where losses are not available for carry-forward in the case of a change in ownership.
Economists see this rule as lacking neutrality as they have always argued that tax losses should be refunded or at least be allowed to be carried forward.

The further argument is that such restriction acts as an impediment to efficient acquisitions. The similar restrictive rule in Malaysia, although introduced in law, has been modified in its operation.
This is particularly helpful.

The widely held practice under a VAT (value added tax)/GST(goods and services tax) regime to exempt financial services is seen as a bias towards households using financial services.

What it means is that it encourages consumers to borrow rather than save until they are able to pay for fully-taxed products.

Malaysia’s GST tax rules, which have yet to be enacted, appear to have adopted the same exemption although details as to how these would operate are not yet known.

Conclusion 

The adoption of the New Economic Model (NEM) is perhaps an opportune time to look at our tax policies. New policy approaches should be in sync with the NEM. For example the implementation of the GST, if accompanied by a marked reduction in the corporate income tax rate, should get rid of the bias towards debt. The loss of tax revenue could be made up by higher GST collections from an increase in per capita income, a key aim of the model.


  • Kang Beng Hoe is executive director of TAXAND MALAYSIA Sdn Bhd, a member firm of the TAXAND Network of independent tax firms worldwide. The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the firm. Readers should seek specific professional advice before acting on the views.

  • Head-Direct HiFiMan HM-801 Audio Player

    Suck It, iPod: Meet the King of Geeky Portable Audio Devices

     Reviewed by Eliot Van Buskirk  • May 06, 2010
    Suck It, iPod: Meet the King of Geeky Portable Audio Devices
    It used to be there were only two ways to improve the sound quality on your portable music player: Ditch the shoddy included earbuds for real headphones, or hook in a headphone amplifier.

    Now there's a third option, in the form of the HiFiMan HM-801 Audio Player.

    This is, without a doubt, the first audiophile-worthy portable digital audio player I've encountered in the past 13 years of covering portable audio technology. Sure, some players have had slightly better sound than the iPod, but none could really deliver sound the way sharp-eared audio purists desire. (We're talking about people who own gold-tipped connection cables and headphones that cost more than your laptop.)

    But the HiFiMan delivers audio that even the snootiest sound snob will find little to gripe with. It does this with a first-of-its-kind preamp (swappable if there's another preamp your ears desire) and the support of not only standard formats (MP3, AAC, WMA, OGG), but multiple lossless formats (APE, WMA, FLAC). There's even 24-bit resolution and a 96-kHz sampling rate for FLAC files.

    That means HiFiMan not only plays lossless files that sound as good as CDs but also 24-bit files that sound better than CDs, with much wider frequency and dynamic ranges. That equates to reproducing very high pitches (even ones outside the human hearing range, which some say colors the sound we can hear), and music with more gradations in volume that allow dynamic nuances to shine through.

    HiFiMan connects to your computer via USB (16-bit 48 kHz) or home stereo system with its digital coaxial input (16-bit 44.1 kHz or 24-bit 96 kHz). Bonus: It can double as an excellent home headphone amplifier through its Burr-Brown PCM1704U digital-to-analog converter.

    Paired with high-quality headphones, the HiFiMan sounds better than an iPod Classic, reputedly the best-sounding model Apple makes, even when playing the same files. We perceived no hiss or distortion, backing up the strong audio specs (102-dB signal-to-noise ratio) and everything from deep bass frequencies to ultrahigh cymbals sounded clearer, punchier. Sonically, it's drastically better than the iPod in every conceivable way.

    We squeezed just over seven hours out of the HiFiMan playing a combination MP3s, lossless files and 24-bit FLAC files. If that's not enough juice, you can pick up a spare battery for another $80. Also worth mentioning is the clean analog volume attenuator that allows smooth, precise control of sound.

    Now the bad news: This thing costs $790. By audiophile standards that's a pittance but for the uninitiated that's plain crazy, especially for a rather homely device with a button-driven interface. Oh yeah, the device has no on-board memory — hard drives cause too much audio interference — so you'll have to supply your own SD cards to store your tunes. Forget about popping this monster in your pants either; at 4.4 x 3.1 x 1 inches, it's a bit too big for pockets. A velvet bag and a mini-briefcase come with it for transportation, but who wants to tote something around that qualifies as carry-on luggage?

    But the most significant reason you might not want to drop nearly 800 bones on the HiFiMan is that your ears simply might not care enough. Sound quality is a game of decreasing returns, and some people don't get the same charge out of ultraclean, expansive, dynamic, crisp, properly imaged sound that audiophiles do.
    But if you're willing to put up the cash and endure its design shortcomings, the HiFiMan's rich quality of sound will enrich the quality of your life.

    WIRED Audiophile-pleasing deep, rich, clean sound. Pulls double duty as portable and home-stereo headphone solution. Walkman looks shout "don't steal me." Modular components (amplifier, battery). Comes with screwdriver and schematics for alternate amp designs.

    TIRED Barely portable — large awkward chassis hard to carry. Menu and button configuration clearly traveled via flux capacitor from 2001. Only a small selection of 24-bit music is available for sale online. No docking station. You'll need high-quality headphones to enjoy the player's sounds.

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    ECB May Kiss Credibility Goodbye: Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer

    Commentary by Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer

    May 11 (Bloomberg) -- There is an old saying among central bankers that credibility is earned in years of hard work, but can be lost overnight. On Sunday night, the European Central Bank may have said goodbye to its credibility when it agreed to buy the government bonds of euro nations in trouble.

    This casts a dark shadow over the euro area’s 750 billion- euro ($980 billion) stability package, which was dressed to impress, and seems to have worked so far. Markets will probably advance in the near term as short positions need to be covered.

    A major casualty of the emergency decisions was the ECB. With its move to prop up the failing bonds of governments in financial distress, it has allowed itself to be transformed into an agent of fiscal policy. The intention to sterilize bond purchases means, in effect, that it taxes euro-area private borrowers to support governments in difficulty. In the long run, this is likely to undermine confidence in the ECB and the euro.

    Markets last week gave their thumbs down to the Greek rescue program led by the euro area and the International Monetary Fund, probably for two reasons: fears that Greece can’t implement the program, and that Greece wouldn’t return to solvency even if it did.

    Here is what has scared investors (apart from the riots in Athens): Even if the IMF program were fully implemented, the Greek debt ratio is projected to rise to 150 percent of gross domestic product by 2013. Assuming an interest rate of 5 percent, Greece would pay 7.5 percent of its GDP to bondholders. With more than 80 percent of creditors being foreign by then, the country would transfer at least 6 percent of its GDP abroad.

    No Trust

    How likely would it be that Greece can generate a structural current account surplus before having to make interest payments of this magnitude? Traders saw little likelihood of this and expected an eventual debt restructuring. And because they didn’t trust the package that the IMF and euro- area governments have offered Greece, they didn’t trust other euro-member countries in fiscal distress to find a viable solution. This, and not a conspiracy of speculators, was the brew that generated contagion.

    The huge stability package has stopped that contagion for the time being, but to ensure lasting success of the coordinated effort, the European Stability Mechanism and the loan guarantee scheme have to be developed into a European Monetary Fund, capable of running adjustment programs and of managing orderly defaults of insolvent countries in the region.

    Managing Debt Burdens

    Earlier this year, we proposed the creation of such a fund designed to manage fiscal crises in the euro area, including a possible bond restructuring of a member country unable to cope with its debt burden. The fund could issue its own debt and create the nucleus of a common euro-bond market. The European stabilization mechanism agreed by the Council of Finance Ministers opens the door to such an instrument.

    Whether the measures announced on the weekend will prove successful depends on whether governments follow up and construct this framework. Without it, the management of public finances will remain ad hoc and crisis-prone. Monetary union may degenerate into the feared “transfer union,” as discretionary bailouts would fuel moral hazard of weak governments.

    The ECB has now joined the list of major central banks that have lost their innocence during this financial crisis by moving closer to fiscal policy than seemed possible not long ago. However, the descent of the ECB from the path of virtue has been the most dramatic. The Maastricht Treaty, on which monetary union was based, states that every country is responsible for its own finances and that the central bank is independent from governments. With its decision to buy failing sovereign debt, the ECB has undermined both principles.

    Fiscal Agent

    To the extent that it does not sterilize the effects of its intervention, it monetizes government debt. To the extent that it does sterilize the purchases, it acts as a fiscal agent, taxing other euro-area borrowers to support a government in fiscal distress. The claim that intervention serves the purpose of creating orderly market conditions seems unconvincing when governments or the ECB decide which market movements are justified and which aren’t.

    The ECB may now have years of hard work to restore the credibility that it put on the line on Sunday night.
    (Daniel Gros is the director of the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. Thomas Mayer is the chief economist of Deutsche Bank AG in Frankfurt. The opinions expressed are their own.)

    --Editors: David Henry, James Greiff.,
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