BEIJING: A multi-billion-euro aid package for Greece will be hammered out within days and the bailout will prevent the crisis from spilling over to other countries, European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso said yesterday.
Speaking to reporters in Beijing, Barroso said he had discussed Greece’s troubles in meetings with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and that China remained confident in the euro even as sovereign debt worries ripple across Europe.
“I don’t think that China is lacking confidence in the European Union (EU) or the euro, on the contrary,” he said.
He also said Chinese leaders “never mentioned” any possible aid for Athens. Reports that Greece would sell bonds to China spurred market optimism earlier this year, but the Greek government subsequently denied there was any deal in place.
Visitors look at an art work featuring a projection of a Chinese renminbi note with a talking Mao Zedong at a gallery in Beijing. The Chinese currency has steadily appreciated against the euro since the end of last year.— AP
International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union (EU) and European Central Bank officials are in Athens to negotiate the bailout and hope to wrap up a deal within days in an effort to avoid a debt default in Greece that could sink other fragile EU countries.
Barroso said they were “making solid, rapid progress” in drawing up the rescue package, reiterating that debt restructuring was not on option for Greece.
He also said the aid deal “will prevent further possible effects” of the crisis from spreading within the EU. German politicians have said the aid package could be worth 100 billion-120 billion euros over three years, against an original plan for 45 billion euros of aid in 2010.
Greece has readied severe austerity measures demanded as a condition for the aid, providing relief to financial markets but drawing threats from unions of a mighty battle to come.
Union officials said the IMF asked Athens to raise sales taxes, scrap bonuses amounting to two extra months pay in the public sector, and accept a three-year pay freeze.
Greece’s debt woes served as a reminder of the need to address economic imbalances both inside and beyond Europe, Barroso said.
In the past, EU leaders have pointed their fingers at an undervalued yuan as a source of global imbalances, fuelling China’s massive trade surplus with Europe. But Barroso had a softer tone in public, at least after his latest round of meetings in Beijing.
“We are not putting pressure on anybody,” he said.
He added that it was natural that “the main global players discuss these issues of global imbalances, because we need to have a common approach, we need to restore growth globally.”
China had “clearly understood” EU’s message on currencies, Barroso said.
Beijing has effectively pegged the yuan at about 6.83 to the dollar since mid-2008, trying to cushion its exporters from the global economic downturn.
Tracking the dollar’s movements, the Chinese currency has steadily appreciated against the euro since the end of last year. — Reuters
CAMBRIDGE – Greece will default on its national debt. That default will be due in large part to its membership in the European Monetary Union. If it were not part of the euro system, Greece might not have gotten into its current predicament and, even if it had gotten into its current predicament, it could have avoided the need to default.
Greece’s default on its national debt need not mean an explicit refusal to make principal and interest payments when they come due. More likely would be an IMF-organized restructuring of the existing debt, swapping new bonds with lower principal and interest for existing bonds.
Or it could be a “soft default” in which Greece unilaterally services its existing debt with new debt rather than paying in cash. But, whatever form the default takes, the current owners of Greek debt will get less than the full amount that they are now owed.
The only way that Greece could avoid a default would be by cutting its future annual budget deficits to a level that foreign and domestic investors would be willing to finance on a voluntary basis. At a minimum, that would mean reducing the deficit to a level that stops the rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
To achieve that, the current deficit of 14% of GDP would have to fall to 5% of GDP or less. But to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to the 60% level prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty would require reducing the annual budget deficit to just 3% of GDP – the goal that the eurozone’s finance ministers have said that Greece must achieve by 2012.
Reducing the budget deficit by 10% of GDP would mean an enormous cut in government spending or a dramatic rise in tax revenue – or, more likely, both. Quite apart from the political difficulty of achieving this would be the very serious adverse effect on aggregate domestic demand, and therefore on production and employment. Greece’s unemployment rate already is 10%, and its GDP is already expected to fall at an annual rate of more than 4%, pushing joblessness even higher.
Depressing economic activity further through higher taxes and reduced government spending would cause offsetting reductions in tax revenue and offsetting increases in transfer payments to the unemployed. So every planned euro of deficit reduction delivers less than a euro of actual deficit reduction. That means that planned tax increases and cuts in basic government spending would have to be even larger than 10% of GDP in order to achieve a 3%-of-GDP budget deficit.
There simply is no way around the arithmetic implied by the scale of deficit reduction and the accompanying economic decline: Greece’s default on its debt is inevitable.
Greece might have been able to avoid that outcome if it were not in the eurozone. If Greece still had its own currency, the authorities could devalue it while tightening fiscal policy. A devalued currency would increase exports and would cause Greek households and firms to substitute domestic products for imported goods. The increased demand for Greek goods and services would raise Greece’s GDP, increasing tax revenue and reducing transfer payments. In short, fiscal consolidation would be both easier and less painful if Greece had its own monetary policy.
Greece’s membership in the eurozone was also a principal cause of its current large budget deficit. Because Greece has not had its own currency for more than a decade, there has been no market signal to warn Greece that its debt was growing unacceptably large.
If Greece had remained outside the eurozone and retained the drachma, the large increased supply of Greek bonds would cause the drachma to decline and the interest rate on the bonds to rise. But, because Greek euro bonds were regarded as a close substitute for other countries’ euro bonds, the interest rate on Greek bonds did not rise as Greece increased its borrowing – until the market began to fear a possible default.
The substantial surge in the interest rate on Greek bonds relative to German bonds in the past few weeks shows that the market now regards such a default as increasingly likely. The combination of credits from the other eurozone countries and lending by the IMF may provide enough liquidity to stave off default for a while. In exchange for this liquidity support, Greece will be forced to accept painful fiscal tightening and falling GDP.
In the end, Greece, the eurozone’s other members, and Greece’s creditors will have to accept that the country is insolvent and cannot service its existing debt. At that point, Greece will default.
Open Hearings in US reveal the degree of greed and fraud on Wall Street Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs were self-interested promoters of risky and complicated financial schemes that helped trigger the crisis, said senator Carl Levin
Ladies and gentlemen,
Allow me to present the Greatest Show on Earth or How Wall Street brought the Financial Crisis on Itself. There is a cast of thousands, from the most famous to the most guilty. Never have so few made so much money from so many.
See how god’s bankers say: “Of course we didn’t dodge the mortgage mess. We lost money, then made more than we lost because of shorts.” Of course they are god’s bankers – they make money on the way up and make money on the way down.
See how the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) and the US Senate Subcommittee Investigating Financial Crisis summon almost every week the stars from Wall Street to show how they did it.
The Senate subcommittee chairman, Democratic Senator Carl Levin, said: “Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs were not simply market-makers, they were self-interested promoters of risky and complicated financial schemes that helped trigger the crisis.
“They bundled toxic mortgages into complex financial instruments, got the credit rating agencies to label them as AAA securities, and sold them to investors, magnifying and spreading risk throughout the financial system, and all too often betting against the instruments they sold and profiting at the expense of their clients.”
Senator Carl Levin holds up paperwork while questioning a Goldman Sachs official. — Reuters
Goldman Sachs’ 2009 annual report stated that the firm “did not generate enormous net revenues by betting against residential-related products.” Levin said: “These emails show that, in fact, Goldman made a lot of money by betting against the mortgage market.”
We must admire the United States for its high level of transparency and its willingness to go after the big guns. What these open hearings reveal is the degree of greed and fraud that Wall Street has perpetrated against the whole world in its pursuit of ever-growing profits.
Investors used to listen to these gods pontificate on the trend of the market and now realise that with proprietary trading, these gods are talking one book and trading also the other way. So if you believed them and bought the market up, they were probably selling the market down. This is known as “risk hedging”, but guess who pays when the market crashes?
The taxpayer bails the investment banks out and they are still laughing all the way to their golden bonuses. April is the cruelest month, especially for Wall Street.
On April 7, the FCIC looked into the securitisation mess, beginning with the testimony of former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan. On April 13, the Senate subcommittee started the first of four major enquiries, which “examined how US financial institutions turned to high-risk lending strategies to earn quick profits, dumping hundreds of billions of dollars in toxic mortgages into the financial system, like polluters dumping poison upstream in a river.”
Coincidentally, on the same day, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Goldman Sachs of fraud.
In the second hearing on April 16 on the role of the regulators, the subcommittee “showed how regulators saw what was going on, understood the risk, but sat on their hands or fought each other rather than stand up to the banks profiting from the pollution. Those toxic mortgages were scooped up by Wall Street firms that bottled them in complex financial instruments, and turned to the credit rating agencies to get a label declaring them to be safe, low-risk, investment grade securities.”
The third hearing on April 23 looked at the role of the credit rating agencies and the fourth hearing on April 27 considered the role of the investment bankers.
On hindsight, it was remarkable that the Wall Street bankers, who always had a good grip on what was happening in Washington, had clearly underestimated the public anger against them and their vulnerability.
The session on the credit rating agencies was most illuminating. There are three major rating agencies in the world that do most of the global credit rating business – Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. Most investors rely on the credit rating agencies to assess the quality of their investments, particularly bonds.
With the arrival of Basel bank supervision rules in the 1980s, bank regulators also use credit ratings to assess whether the capital-risk weights are appropriate. Thus, if a bank were to hold junk bonds, then the capital requirements would be higher. Of course, pension and money market funds use the credit ratings to distinguish between safe and risky investments.
The result is that having a AAA credit rating was very helpful to borrowing at cheap rates, whereas a downgrade would not only increase the cost of funds, but also cut off liquidity as investors dump the securities and refuse to hold such downgraded debt.
In the last 10 years, the three biggest credit rating agencies gave AAA ratings to the residential mortgage backed securities, or RMBS, and collateralised debt obligations, or CDOs that fuelled the derivative market bubble. Between 2002 and 2007, these agencies doubled their revenues, from less than US$3bil to over US$6bil per year. Between 2000 and 2006, investment banks underwrote nearly US$2 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, US$435bil or 36% of which were backed by subprime mortgages.
At the heart of the problem is the inherent conflict of interest of the credit rating agencies, because they charged fees for a “public good service”. The Senate subcommittee called this “like one of the parties in court paying the judge’s salary, or one of the teams in a competition paying the salary of the referee.”
The investors thought that they were buying super-safe securities rated AAA. But in reality, 91% of the AAA subprime RMBS issued in 2007, and 93% of those issued in 2006, have since been downgraded to junk status. It was the collapse of confidence in the ratings, which led to the withdrawal of liquidity in the market that triggered the meltdown in 2008.
This is only the beginning of the dirt that is coming out of Wall Street. The show will continue.
THINK ASIAN By ANDREW SHENG
● Datuk Seri Panglima Andrew Sheng is adjunct professor at Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, and Tsinghua University, Beijing. He has served in key positions at Bank Negara, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, and is currently a member of Malaysia’s National Economic Advisory Council. He is the author of the book From Asian to Global Financial Crisis.
