China tests warming waters for North African role
Midweek
By BUNN NAGARA
Western powers gradually welcome Beijing’s growing contribution to regional maritime security.
AFTER some reflection, US and EU states are now coming round to China’s proposal for clearer national roles in securing international shipping between North Africa and South Asia.
Last November at the UN, Beijing floated the prospect of individual countries policing clearly identified zones through area allotments. A month before a Chinese ship had been hijacked in the pirate-infested region.
The US was cool to Beijing’s proposal at first but now appears to welcome it. The Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC) is supposedly a safer stretch of water between the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, but pirate attacks have lately extended outwards.
With some 40 national navies involved there is no shortage of national interests, but better coordination had always been lacking. China pushed for streamlining operations and has found a positive response from the West.
Some countries are grouped into the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the European Union or Nato. Others like Malaysia, India, Russia and China run their operations separately.
Meanwhile, China would now also head the rotating chair of the so-called Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) group that has been dominated by the US and EU.
Top CMF and EU naval officials have in recent days warmly welcomed China’s growing role.
This comes as open confirmation of operations already underway. Since its founding in 2008 and through monthly multinational meetings, SHADE has seen the Chinese and other national navies exchanging information in useful and productive ways.
A Hong Kong news report last week said Beijing would now have to increase its naval presence in the Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean region, but this was swiftly denied.
China is careful about its mounting international responsibilities, and even more about foreign perceptions of its intent and conduct.
Chinese officials see the present moment as a double-edged sword. As a time of opportunity it offers China a rare chance to introduce itself agreeably to the world at large, but with turns of anxiety its intentions might also be misread.
Hawks and conservatives abroad were already irked by the prospect last month of Beijing taking over the Indian Ocean refuelling role from Tokyo.
In Japan, ending that function of serving US-led forces in Afghanistan has been blamed on Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, but moves in that direction had already been announced in 2007 by then premier Yasuo Fukuda.
The right-wing in Japanese politics in particular has been vocal in seeing a “net loss” for Japan and a “net gain” for China. However, more reasonable and neutral observers draw quite different conclusions.
From each nation whose imports and exports rely on the safety of international shipping, a comparable degree of responsibility in contributing to security is expected. No country is entitled to benefit more from an international security regime than it is prepared to provide for.
Furthermore, by working together, the navies of the various countries tend to develop a better understanding of one another that can help reduce tension and misperception. A mutual confidence-building mechanism comes into play to benefit all parties, replacing suspicion with greater trust.
This trust is particularly pertinent with a rising major power like China. Not only will it help others understand China better, it will also help China understand the rest of the world better as well.
The alternative is a build-down in mutual confidence, to which no party will seriously subscribe. Reason and pragmatism have helped sustain the general welcome for China taking up its due responsibilities.
Beijing’s interests are clear enough: securing the sea lanes for its vital energy imports, and its exports of manufactured goods. Beyond that, it seeks to cultivate a positive international image in its global dealings.
It has thus sought to play down its new central role in SHADE, describing it as a mere coordinating function. It has also repeatedly emphasised the need for the United Nations rather than any particular country to lead in initiatives.
China is aware that the spotlight on it can reveal its willingness to contribute in international concerns, as well as its conduct in multilateral efforts. It is also hoping to avoid allegations of hitching a free ride in international maritime security, while not making too many waves in sailing forth.
AFTER some reflection, US and EU states are now coming round to China’s proposal for clearer national roles in securing international shipping between North Africa and South Asia.
Last November at the UN, Beijing floated the prospect of individual countries policing clearly identified zones through area allotments. A month before a Chinese ship had been hijacked in the pirate-infested region.
The US was cool to Beijing’s proposal at first but now appears to welcome it. The Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC) is supposedly a safer stretch of water between the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, but pirate attacks have lately extended outwards.
With some 40 national navies involved there is no shortage of national interests, but better coordination had always been lacking. China pushed for streamlining operations and has found a positive response from the West.
Some countries are grouped into the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the European Union or Nato. Others like Malaysia, India, Russia and China run their operations separately.
Meanwhile, China would now also head the rotating chair of the so-called Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) group that has been dominated by the US and EU.
Top CMF and EU naval officials have in recent days warmly welcomed China’s growing role.
This comes as open confirmation of operations already underway. Since its founding in 2008 and through monthly multinational meetings, SHADE has seen the Chinese and other national navies exchanging information in useful and productive ways.
A Hong Kong news report last week said Beijing would now have to increase its naval presence in the Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean region, but this was swiftly denied.
China is careful about its mounting international responsibilities, and even more about foreign perceptions of its intent and conduct.
Chinese officials see the present moment as a double-edged sword. As a time of opportunity it offers China a rare chance to introduce itself agreeably to the world at large, but with turns of anxiety its intentions might also be misread.
Hawks and conservatives abroad were already irked by the prospect last month of Beijing taking over the Indian Ocean refuelling role from Tokyo.
In Japan, ending that function of serving US-led forces in Afghanistan has been blamed on Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, but moves in that direction had already been announced in 2007 by then premier Yasuo Fukuda.
The right-wing in Japanese politics in particular has been vocal in seeing a “net loss” for Japan and a “net gain” for China. However, more reasonable and neutral observers draw quite different conclusions.
From each nation whose imports and exports rely on the safety of international shipping, a comparable degree of responsibility in contributing to security is expected. No country is entitled to benefit more from an international security regime than it is prepared to provide for.
Furthermore, by working together, the navies of the various countries tend to develop a better understanding of one another that can help reduce tension and misperception. A mutual confidence-building mechanism comes into play to benefit all parties, replacing suspicion with greater trust.
This trust is particularly pertinent with a rising major power like China. Not only will it help others understand China better, it will also help China understand the rest of the world better as well.
The alternative is a build-down in mutual confidence, to which no party will seriously subscribe. Reason and pragmatism have helped sustain the general welcome for China taking up its due responsibilities.
Beijing’s interests are clear enough: securing the sea lanes for its vital energy imports, and its exports of manufactured goods. Beyond that, it seeks to cultivate a positive international image in its global dealings.
It has thus sought to play down its new central role in SHADE, describing it as a mere coordinating function. It has also repeatedly emphasised the need for the United Nations rather than any particular country to lead in initiatives.
China is aware that the spotlight on it can reveal its willingness to contribute in international concerns, as well as its conduct in multilateral efforts. It is also hoping to avoid allegations of hitching a free ride in international maritime security, while not making too many waves in sailing forth.